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Introduction 
In a more extensive study, presented at the RATIO Conference on 
Knowledge and Policy Change in August of 2011, I examined the role 
economists played in the Swedish public debate over its financial and 
economic crisis of 1992 and 1993 (Jakee 2011). I argued that this Swedish 
experience is highly relevant for the financial crises faced by the United 
States and Europe, post-2007. The very survival of Sweden’s famed 
welfare state was fiercely debated during the 1992–93 crisis, just as the 
redistributive polices of Western Europe and the United States are being 
debated in the wake of their own crises.  
Ultimately, Sweden’s welfare state survived, but was fundamentally 
reformed nearly twenty years ago. As a result, the Swedish economic 
conditions of the early 1990s and the subsequent policy adjustments hold 
insights for current policymakers facing a very similar set of problems and 
economic constraints. For example, many of the same underlying 
conditions that gave rise to the austerity measures adopted in Greece, 
Ireland, and Italy between 2010 and 2012, have much in common with the 
1990’s Swedish experience. The same is true of the monumental reforms 
contemplated (and largely ignored) with regard to Social Security or 
Medicare in the United States.1  
                                                     
1
 See, for example, the budget plan, referred to as the Ryan Plan, submitted to the 
U.S. House of Representatives for fiscal year 2013 by US House republicans and 
spearheaded by House Budget Committee Chairman, Paul Ryan (House 
Republicans 2012).  
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More to the point of this chapter, however, contemporary policy 
analysts can gain insights into the process whereby expert, theoretical 
views of the economy clash with the world views of both laymen and 
other non-economist experts. In particular, how do non-economists 
understand the policies that shape their lives and how do economic experts 
try to persuade non-experts when it comes to the latter’s understanding of 
policy and “the economy?” While the RATIO paper dealt with these broad 
questions, this chapter focuses on the clash between different generations 
of economists (with different theoretical outlooks) and between economists 
and other social scientists. Indeed, as the title suggests, the question of 
how the views of one generation of economists give way to the next 
generation is of fundamental concern here.  
In terms of the form of the economic debate, the Swedish media seem 
to give policy issues, particularly economic ones, great emphasis. This fact 
is evidenced by the large number of both regular and special features in 
the newspapers, TV talk shows and news programs. Such programs 
regularly featured Sweden’s top bank, industrial and labor economists. 
The Swedish debate was, moreover, populated by a number of highly 
distinguished academicians. That well-known Swedish academicians 
played a key role in these debates and that they participated at all levels of 
policymaking is not peculiar to the 1990s’ debate either. As Jonung states, 
“A striking feature of the Swedish economics profession, in contrast to 
most other countries, is the heavy involvement of its professors in public 
life … a tradition going back to the founders of economics in Sweden” 
(1992, 39). Academic and professional economists have taken to the 
public forum dating back to the nineteenth century. David Davidson, Karl-
Gustav Hammarskjöld, Per-Erik Bergfalk and Knut Wicksell are among 
the earliest to do so (Magnusson 1993, 89). This tradition also took firm 
root among the first generation of Swedish economists early in the 
twentieth century, which included Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Gösta 
Bagge and Sven Brisman, as well as the generation that followed, 
including Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, Erik Lindahl and Erik Lundberg.  
As a result of such active public involvement, the economics 
profession has probably been more visible in Sweden than elsewhere, if 
not more influential (see, for example, Carlson and Jonung 2006). Going 
back as far as the 1930s, a foreign visitor to Sweden took note of “the 
influence that the professional economists seemed to have on politicians 
both of right and left, on banking and business people as well as on the lay 
public. [Economists in Sweden] … seem, moreover as a class, to have a 
better public reputation than elsewhere” (Brinley Thomas, quoted in 
Magnusson 1993, 83). This visibility provides insights for students of 
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public policy because it illuminates the process whereby academicians 
enter the world of public persuasion. As such, Sweden may be just the 
kind of ideal case about which many non-Swedish economists fantasize. 
Krugman (1994) argues, for example, that the United States would enjoy 
improved economic policies if academic economists could crowd out the 
special interest “policy entrepreneurs” by playing a larger role in public 
persuasion.  
This study is based on unpublished interviews performed during the 
spring and summer of 1993. I interviewed a number of economists and 
other social scientists in Sweden, focusing on, among other things, the role 
that economists were playing during the 1992–93 economic and financial 
crisis. The interviewees were chosen on the basis of a variety of 
characteristics, the principal objective being to assemble a list of 
participants who could discuss the crisis from a variety of expert-
participant viewpoints, in historical context. As such, several interviewees 
were economists involved to a greater (e.g., Calmfors, Edin, Södersten) or 
lesser (e.g., Jonung) extent in the 1990s national public debate; two were 
political scientists (e.g., Gustavsson, Petersson) and two were sociologists 
(e.g., Korpi, Zetterberg). Several interviewees were not involved with the 
1990s debate, but were major figures in earlier Swedish debates over the 
advancement of the welfare state (e.g., Elvander, Faxén, Meidner, Rehn). 
See Table 1 for a list of interviewees and summary biographies. 
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Table 1: The Interviewees 
Economists Position at the time of the 1992-93 Crisis 
Lars Calmfors: Professor, Institute for International 
Economic Studies, Stockholm University. 
P.O. Edin:  Chief Economist, LO (Sweden’s widely 
encompassing blue-collar labor union) 
F.O. Faxén:  Former Director of Economic Research, 
SAF (Sweden’s Employer Federation) 
Lars Jonung:  Professor, Stockholm School of Economics 
and former Economic Adviser to the Prime 
Minister 
Rudolf Meidner:  Former Research Director, LO; Swedish 
Institute of Labor Market Studies, 
Stockholm University 
Gösta Rehn:  Former LO economist 
Bo Södersten:  Professor, Lund University and former MP 
Political Scientists 
Nils Elvander:  Professor emeritus, Uppsala University 
Sverker Gustavsson: Docent (Assoc. Professor), Uppsala 
University  
Douglas Hibbs:  Professor, Gothenberg University 
Olof Petersson:  Docent (Assoc. Professor), Uppsala 
University  
Sociologists 
Walter Korpi:  Professor, Stockholm University  
Hans Zetterberg:  Former Professor and Chair, Ohio State 
University, Opinion analyst and Publicist 
Policymaker 
Kjell-Olof Feldt:  Former Minister of Finance (and Chairman 
of the World Bank and Chairman of the 
International Monetary Fund) 
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The larger study argues that four themes emerge from a careful 
examination of hundreds of pages of interview transcripts: 
i) Two opposing interpretations of the crisis can be discerned: one 
that centered on causes of the crisis that were endogenous or 
“internal” to Swedish policy; another that centered on causes that 
were “external” to Sweden or outside of its control. 
ii) A strong degree of consensus emerged among the academic 
economists (and several of the non-economists) involved in the 
public debate that largely aligned with the “internal” causes 
narrative. 
iii) Claims concerning the reliability and veracity of economic 
arguments were exaggerated on both sides (and by participants in 
previous debates).  
iv) The “scientific” mantle of economists frequently operated like a 
“trump card” in policy debates. 
The current chapter focuses on one aspect raised in the larger study: 
the strong degree of consensus over Swedish economic analysis that 
dominated the public forums in Sweden. I discuss the implications of this 
phenomenon, some potential reasons for its existence, and draw some 
parallels and contrasts with previous policy debates in Sweden. Besides 
simply understanding the Swedish case better, this study attempts to add to 
the literature on policy formation and change. It also attempts to add to a 
separate literature on the “rhetoric of economics,” which has, for the most 
part, focused on how economists persuade one another, in other words, 
how they argue among themselves, how they decide what constitutes a 
valid argument, and what metaphors or stories they use (see, for example, 
McCloskey, 1983, or Klamer 1983).2 
Coats (1984) pointed out some time ago that a lacuna existed in the 
analysis of the actual processes by which economists persuade non-
economists—unlike, for example, scholarship in the history of science; 
this lacuna has largely remained unaddressed. Thus, we know little about 
                                                     
2
 The seminal authority in the rhetoric of economics that uses actual interviews is 
Klamer’s Conversations with Economists (1983). My study of Swedish economists 
differs from Klamer’s approach in that his work is confined to discussions among 
economists, and his rhetorical exploration is in the realm of macroeconomic 
theory. In contrast, the current work explores the differences among economists, as 
well as between economists and other social scientists, regarding approaches to 
economic policy. The current study might therefore be thought of as an 
investigation into how the theoretical discussions in Klamer make their way to 
policy discussions. 
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how economists shift between their roles as academicians, protectors of 
the “general interest,” and purveyors of special interests or, to borrow 
Goodwin’s terminology (1988), the distinction between philosopher, 
priest and hired gun. I attempt to shed some additional light on the process 
whereby one generation of economists publicly engage both non-
economists and the legacy of previous generations of economists.  
In the next section, I briefly outline some of the details of the 1990s’ 
Swedish economic crisis. Section three sketches the broad contours of the 
1992–93 debate that surrounded the crisis. The fourth section focuses on 
the overwhelming dominance of one side of the public debate and traces a 
similar pattern in Sweden’s past. Section five discusses some potential 
reasons for the pattern of narrow public opinions among Sweden’s public-
going economists. 
The Crisis 
Swedish society in 1992 and 1993 did not exhibit the model character 
for which it had become renowned over the previous half century. 
Although it had faced several other economic crises, including the oil 
crises of the 1970s, a productivity slowdown, and budget crisis in the early 
1980s, none appears to have threatened its progressive social, political and 
economic agenda like the financial and economic crisis of the early 1990s. 
In 1993, unemployment, one of the sacrosanct pillars of the Swedish 
welfare state, sat above nine percent; the unofficial rate (including those 
on state training schemes) was above thirteen percent in 1993 (Lindbeck et 
al. 1993, 1). Compare these measures to an average of one to three percent 
in the 1980s. Manufacturing output declined by seventeen percent between 
1991 and 1993, a larger decline than the one experienced in the 
Depression of the 1930s (Lindbeck et al. 1993, 2). This decline was nearly 
fifty percent larger than the approximately twelve percent manufacturing 
decline in the United States during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. GDP 
fell a total of six percent between 1991 and 1993 and standards of living 
fell: Sweden ranked fourteenth in OECD comparisons of GNP per capita 
in the early 1990s compared to third place in the early 1970s. The federal 
government budget position went from a surplus of almost six  percent of 
GDP as late as 1989 (OECD 1990, 136) to an unsustainable fifteen percent 
deficit in 1993. In fact, Sweden’s public debt continued to increase 
throughout the 1990s until it reached nearly eighty five percent of GDP. It 
also suffered a currency crisis in which the krona fell by roughly thirty 
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percent.3 And although the fall in the currency was a boost to exporters, a 
number of important Swedish firms, including its largest banks, either 
failed, or were bailed out by the Swedish government. Early cost estimates 
of the state bailout of the banking sector were estimated to be more than 
five percent of GDP (Lybeck 1993). 
In political terms, the once-hegemonic Social Democratic Party no 
longer ruled unchallenged and the so-called “corporatist” arrangement 
had, for all practical purposes, fallen into disarray in the years leading up 
to the crisis.4 And, there were social upheavals. Many of the generous 
social insurance programs for which Sweden had been famous were 
reduced, causing social unrest and a concern for the future that had been 
conspicuously absent in previous decades.5 Finally, Sweden began to face 
problems familiar to other nations regarding a growing and dissatisfied 
immigrant population. 
The Crisis Debate 
Not surprisingly, this state of affairs provoked controversy in Sweden 
as politicians, social scientists and various commentators, not to mention 
the average citizen, tried to sort out exactly what was happening to their 
once-envied system. Outside the country, even strong proponents of 
Sweden’s special brand of social democracy and corporatism noticed the 
severe hardships faced by the welfare state par excellence and wondered 
what had gone wrong. As one of the interviewees, Olof Petersson, 
remarked, Sweden had been the destination for welfare-statist social 
scientists for well over thirty years. By the early 1990s, the numbers had 
dwindled to a trickle. 
                                                     
3
 After months of trying to stave off a currency devaluation, the central bank was 
forced to relent in November 1992, and the currency, which had been pegged, was 
allowed to float. The crisis arose because of the government and central bank’s 
determined commitment to keep the krona pegged at its old rate.  
4
 Corporatism refers to the coordination of the nation’s “overarching” interests—
the tri-partite institutions of organized labor, organized employers and government. 
A key aspect of the system was the setting of wage policies and the management of 
other macroeconomic policies to, theoretically, maximize the objectives of the 
three groups (see, for example, Micheletti 1993). 
5
 For example, there were cutbacks in health care and privatization in health 
services encouraged (see Financial Times, March 18, 1994, for a brief description 
of the privatization measures). Even sacred programs like the famous Daghems, 
the publicly-run child daycare centers, were targeted for cutbacks and 
privatization. 
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The debate over policy and indeed the future of Sweden took a 
prominent place in print and TV media during the 1992–93 crisis. 
Ordinary citizens were deluged with news updates and commentary on the 
plight of the country. There were nearly daily news stories, op-ed pieces, 
special print series and even multiple televised prime-time educational 
programs throughout the crisis. Each of the interviewees was a nationally-
recognized expert in his field and many were household names in Sweden. 
Although not all of the interviewees were actively involved in the public 
debate of 1992–1993, each had had some national public prominence 
either during that debate or in earlier Swedish public debates. 
A key feature of the interview material is that the fourteen participants 
can be divided, relatively easily, into two intellectual camps. First, there 
were those who reasoned that the crisis was largely the result of a fall-off 
in aggregate demand that was, itself, a function of the general economic 
malaise in other European economies; as a result, these individuals 
expected the crisis to be short-lived. This is what I will call the “external 
causes” argument and it implies that Sweden and its renowned welfare 
state policies were not to blame for its troubles. The crisis, in other words, 
provided no compelling reason to change policy course. 
The opposing “internal causes” view interpreted the crisis as a long-
term result of structural imbalances within the heavily-regulated and 
heavily-taxed Swedish economy. As such, Swedish policy was responsible 
for the crisis. While it was relatively novel in Sweden at the time, the 
argument has, by now, become reasonably familiar: High levels of state 
intervention in the form of generous unemployment benefits and social 
insurance programs were said to create strong work disincentives and 
moral hazard problems. In addition, high marginal income tax rates and a 
ballooning government budget deficit were argued to threaten future 
economic growth prospects. 
These two positions surely represent characterizations of polar 
extremes. While some of the interviewees might have argued over 
subtleties, as a general rule, it was not difficult to classify each participant 
as falling into one camp or the other.6 In fact, positioning each interviewee 
on the continuum from external causes to internal ones provides a key 
insight into the public debate process. Most importantly, those who held 
the view that internal causes were to blame argued for more immediate—
and austere—economic and political reforms, while those holding the 
                                                     
6 The following interviewees argued that internal factors caused the crisis: 
Calmfors, Elvander, Feldt, Jonung, Petersson, Rehn, Södersten, Zetterberg; the 
following argued that external factors caused the crisis: Edin, Gustavsson, Korpi, 
Meidner. 
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external-causes thesis were more likely to argue for maintaining Sweden’s 
status quo.  
Of the several themes that emerged from the interviews, I want to 
focus on the overwhelming consensus of most of the contemporary 
economists (and several of the non-economists) around the market-
oriented, internal-causes thesis, which implied that Sweden needed to 
profoundly alter its policy course. The notion that there was a fairly 
narrow range of economic viewpoints that dominated the public sphere, 
and that it was predominantly market-oriented (with public choice 
undercurrents), was supported by virtually all of the interviewees. In fact, 
most suggested the public debate was relatively “one-sided,” and usually 
over-simplistic, even when they found themselves on the dominant side. 
Furthermore, most agreed that the public debates had been equally narrow 
in previous debates when a much more progressive agenda had dominated.  
This background sets up two key features of economists’ involvement 
in grand Swedish policy debates. First, it is remarkable that a minority of 
relatively free-market intellectuals were dominating the public “ideas” 
sphere in a country that was probably most famous, even at that time, for 
its highly-developed welfare state, labor union influence and social 
democratic hegemony. There was considerable dissonance between the 
1992–93 message of scaling back government and the many decades of 
intellectual support for the welfare state.  
In fact, Boréus (1994) documents the “rightward” ideological shift in 
the public political-economic debate in Sweden between 1969 and 1989. 
She concludes that neoliberals had “broken through” in the public sphere 
by the early 1980s, and were “well established”—but not “hegemonic”—
by the late 1980s (1994, 7). My analysis suggests that in the few years 
between 1989, when the Boréus’ study ends, and 1992–1993, the period in 
which I focus, the neoliberal position became hegemonic in the public 
sphere. While expert dissent from traditional supporters of the welfare 
state persisted, these voices were in a small minority.  
The second noteworthy feature of the debates is that a small number of 
policy experts arguing strongly against traditional experts and popular 
views of the state and its capabilities was hardly novel to Sweden in the 
1990s. Very similar dynamics had arisen in the previous hundred years, 
around the turn of the twentieth century and again in the interwar period.  
A Look Back: A History of Narrow Economic Views 
To summarize, a relatively small group of academic economists 
clashed with the Swedish policy establishment and Swedish lay opinion 
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during the 1992–93 public debate. As such, this group’s views diverged 
strongly from the previous generation of Swedish economic thought. 
Indeed, both the policies and the dissemination of redistributive policies 
owed a significant debt to at least several decades of economists who 
spearheaded their development with both economic theory, participation 
on official government “commissions” (utredningar), and public persuasion. 
The progressive agenda began with a generation of economists, known as 
the “Stockholm School” of the 1930s, that developed theories and public 
arguments for price stabilization and the permanent elimination of 
unemployment through public works projects.7 They also developed proto-
macro models independent of Keynes that involved, among other things, 
the idea of countercyclical government policies. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
Myrdal, along with his activist wife, Alva, provided the economic 
rationale for comprehensive family and housing policies (see Lundberg 
1985), arguing that these policies would both improve the living 
conditions of Swedes and foster long-term economic prosperity.8  
In the 1950s, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, known for the “Rehn-
Meidner” model, aimed to solve the problems of both full employment 
and inflation, simultaneously, by squeezing the profitability of firms. The 
idea was to put pressure on firms to deny uncompetitive wage increases 
and consequently cost-push inflation. Their model also encouraged 
subsidizing the mobility of labor from declining industries to expanding 
ones.9 Later, in the 1960s, Gösta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxén and Clas-Erik 
Odhner, economists from opposites sides of the leading industrial relations 
institutes (i.e., labor- versus employer-sponsored), produced a collaborative 
effort known as the “EFO” industrial relations model (1973).10 This model 
was yet another example of the so-called collaborative corporatist 
                                                     
7
 Carlson (1993, 190) details Lindahl’s and Myrdal’s public arguments for the 
elimination of unemployment. See Lundberg (1985, 7–10) for a summary of the 
Stockholm School’s ideas and a contrast of these with Keynes’ General Theory. 
See also Jonung (1992, especially 29) for a brief survey and classification of the 
twentieth century history of economic thought in Sweden. 
8
 See Heclo and Madsen (1987, 209–210) for a summary of how various theories 
were manifested in policy and the influence that Myrdal had implementing them. 
See also Carlson (1990) for an extensive treatment of the Myrdal’s influence on 
family policy in Sweden. 
9 See Lundberg (1985, 17–19) and Sandelin (1991, 221–22).  
10
 Gösta Edgren worked for the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried 
Employees (“Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation” or “TCO”), Karl-Olof Faxén 
for the Swedish Employers' Confederation (“Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen” or 
“SAF”), and Clas-Erik Odhner for the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(“Landsorganisationen i Sverige” or “LO”). 
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approach that Sweden took to labor market problems.11 And, Meidner 
needs mention again for his advocacy of the “wage-earner funds” in the 
1970s, a policy designed to transfer the shares, and thus control, of 
Sweden’s industries to the labor unions by means of a government-
sponsored pension fund.12  
The policies espoused by these economists were pivotal in 
rationalizing the corporatist welfare state and they tended to be far more 
progressive than the mainstream work being done in the Keynesian-driven 
Anglo-American world. They are the economists who dominated the 
public debates from roughly the 1940s until the wake of market-oriented 
economists came to dominate sometime in the early 1990s. 
What most observers—including many Swedes—do not realize, 
however, is that this dramatic pendular swing in Swedish economic advice 
did not begin in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the swing has precedent 
much earlier: before the Swedish progressives of the mid-twentieth 
century took charge of the economic agenda, a group of conservative, or 
so-called “bourgeois” economists dominated the public sphere in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, Sweden’s public-oriented 
economic professors took a predominantly market-oriented stance for a 
number of decades around the turn of the twentieth century. The support 
for laissez-faire policies in Sweden was fashioned under the dominance of 
economists such as Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher. 
Their stance was so clearly defined that Heckscher noted (around mid-
twentieth century) that the “most striking feature of the Swedish economic 
debate during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was its 
overwhelming laissez-faire character” (quoted in Magnusson 1993, 87). In 
fact, Gunnar Myrdal’s complaints about the public dominance of the 
bourgeois economists that preceded the rise of the Stockholm School 
                                                     
11
 The EFO model set out rules concerning the range for wage increases in the 
private sector based on growth and productivity. “It was understood that the 
distribution would be carried out, in part, according to the ‘solidaristic wage 
policy,’ which was pushed by low income unions in LO [“Landsorganisationen i 
Sverige,” Sweden’s national trade union umbrella organization] , in order to 
improve the income levels and wage differentials of low wage workers” (Olsson 
1990, 30). Furthermore, the model assumed that public sector wage increases 
would match private sector ones and that the government was responsible for the 
employment level.  
12 Swedish economists’ role in the progressive build-up of the welfare state 
summarized here would correspond to the following classifications developed by 
Jonung (1992, 29): “The Stockholm School (of the 1930s) and “Economics as a 
science applied to the welfare state” (circa 1950–1975). 
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instigated his project that would become The Political Element in the 
Development of Economic Theory (Myrdal 1990 [1930]).13 
This brief examination of twentieth century economic thinking on 
Sweden’s grand policy trajectory suggests that the narrow range of public 
debate was not novel to the 1990s. Indeed, the internal-causes proponents 
often remarked about the difficulty of getting any market-oriented views 
into the public forum prior to the 1990s. For example, Zetterberg 
remarked, “You must realize that this country has been virtually insulated 
from the capitalist debate and capitalist ideologies over several 
generations. There’s not a single journalist in this country that defends 
capitalism” (1993). And Jonung opined, “... in the old days, the social 
democratic hegemony, or dominance, was just absolute. You had to be a 
member of the party in order to have [public] input. It was basically a one 
party country and [it] was not fostering any debate” (1993). Even one of 
the star progressive economists who had been among those in a dominant 
position in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Rudolf Meidner, stated that he 
thought, 
we were dominant in a way which was not only positive ... [T]he 
dominance of the labor movement ... gave [us] a position and an influence 
which I think was a little too much. We had no real hard debates with, for 
example, the economists of SAF [the employers’ union]. … We could 
practically ignore them. It is my feeling that we neglected their existence 
(Meidner 1993). 
Why So Narrow? 
While the Anglo-American world also saw an economic paradigm shift 
from market liberalism to Keynesianism in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century and back to liberalism in the final decades, the Swedish 
case appears more extreme and was carried out more publicly than 
elsewhere. What accounts for the strong degree of economic consensus in 
Sweden? As noted, most participants felt the range of opinion was narrow 
both in the 1990s and in previous debates. When asked what might 
                                                     
13 Carlson (1993), Jonung (1992), Lundberg (1985), Magnusson (1993) and 
Sandelin (1991) all trace this swing from market liberalism to Sweden’s special 
progressive agenda. In particular, Carlson (1993) provides an excellent description 
of the shift from the earlier market-oriented economic views of the old school of 
Swedish economists to the “new economics” of the 1930s, and the extent to which 
that debate was carried out in the media. 
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account for that lack of diversity in views, there was near unanimous 
opinion that the size of the country constrained the range of debate.14  
While small size might suggest less heterogeneity of views and 
opinions, this rationale does not help us understand how a provocative 
minority of economists comes to dominate the public debates. To decipher 
this phenomenon, it is useful to briefly consider economic theories on the 
“production” of ideas. A key aspect of the “economics of science,” for 
example, posits the existence of increasing returns to scale in the process 
of developing and disseminating ideas (Stephan 1996). In other words, the 
production of ideas shares much in common with industries such as 
software development (where the fixed costs of a new development are 
enormous relative to the marginal costs of producing a single additional 
unit once the application exists). Scale economies do not necessarily imply 
that unorthodox ideas will be nonexistent, but rather they will need certain 
forms of social and material support like institutional funding, professional 
exposure, grants to support research in such areas, and the like, in order to 
take hold and spread more generally. Thus, the presence of scale 
economies in the production of ideas might well account for Sweden’s 
narrow “specialization” in the production of economic advice.15 
Other peculiar Swedish factors, closely connected to the scale issue, 
also likely account for the narrow range of economic opinion. First, there 
is a long tradition in Sweden in which the few full professors of economics 
have played a substantial role in public policy and public debate. 
Magnusson (1993) describes, for example, the public rhetorical efforts of 
Swedish economists early in the twentieth century to popularize their 
“science,” efforts from which the subsequent generation of Swedish 
economists benefited enormously. Jonung (1992, 40-43) and Carlson and 
Jonung (2006) also emphasize the importance of the “extracurricular” 
activities of the academic economists of that time period. The two latter 
articles provide a count of newspaper articles written by Knut Wicksell 
(approximately 450), Gustav Cassel (1506), Eli Heckscher (approximately 
300) and Bertil Ohlin (approximately 2000) along with a list of 
publications in the topical Ekonomisk debatt, a journal which provides a 
forum for policy debates and current economic issues of the day. Jonung 
(1992, 21-22) also lists the twentieth century professors of economics who 
became active politicians: of the eighty four Swedish professors of 
                                                     
14 Calmfors, Edin, Feldt, Gustavsson, Hibbs, Korpi, Meidner and Zetterberg all 
noted this feature.  
15
 On a related topic, Jakee and Kenneally (2010) develop a formal model of 
“paradigm change” within economics and empirically test it b examining the rise 
and fall of the central planning paradigm.  
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economics last century, seven were active in politics at the national level 
and this does not include those who did not attain the rarefied rank of 
professor. Incidentally, this list includes some internationally-renowned 
economists, such as Gunnar Heckscher and Nobel laureates Bertil Ohlin 
and Gunnar Myrdal.  
Another factor, connected to the scale issue, centers on the fact that, 
historically, Sweden’s academic structure has been extremely hierarchical, 
typically with only a single full professor in a department. Because of the 
limited number of economics departments, there is a significant concentration 
of academic influence and power in those few departments; and the 
Universities of Stockholm, Uppsala, Lund, and Göteborg have played the 
most dominant role. Given Sweden’s academic structure, only a small 
number of leading experts need to change their minds to profoundly 
transform the dominant economic thinking. It is not surprising, then, that 
changes in economic ideas are likely to occur more rapidly in smaller 
countries like Sweden, particularly when very few players dominate the 
disciplinary field at any given time.  
Closely linked to the concentration of professors, the funding 
mechanisms for research have been narrowly focused and controlled by a 
relatively small number of funding agencies. When the objectives of those 
agencies evolved, over time, from a welfare-statist to a more market-
oriented one, so too did much of the research. This feature is also likely to 
be a function of the small size of Sweden, a view that was supported by an 
external assessment of Swedish academic economics conducted by two 
internationally-renowned economists, Avinash Dixit and Nobel-laureate 
Robert Solow, along with Finnish economist, Seppo Honkapohja (1992).16 
As part of the same assessment, Stenkula and Engwall (1992) also 
conclude that “well over half of the overall [research] resources [going to 
economics] were allocated to the nation’s capital” (66). 
Tied to the forgoing characterization of a small number of hierarchical 
departments dominating economics in Sweden, the Dixit et al. (1992, 175-
176) assessment highlights the deleterious effects of the lack of mobility 
between and among Sweden’s various research institutes and academic 
departments. These constraints on the movement of personnel may also 
play a role in explaining why research resources were concentrated rather 
narrowly. Several of the interviewees, on both sides of the debate, 
indicated that support and funding had very much been a function of 
whose “camp” one was in. In fact, several participants referred spontaneously 
                                                     
16
 They concluded that the Institute for International Economic Studies at 
Stockholm University is by far the dominant research organization (in terms either 
of economics departments or independent research institutes).  
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to the case of a well-known Swedish economist who could not get funding 
for his projects, simply because he was unpopular with the research 
establishment through much of his career. In one interviewee’s account, 
even referees, who themselves did not have ultimate authority over 
funding, were reluctant to give favorable reports for fear of reprisals from 
those who did wield power.  
At the broader level, Elvander also suggested the existence of influence 
from the corporate world:  
Not that big business has been able to buy social science people. No, there 
is no corruption. But we have a system of fund raising where business has 
been giving money, Wallenberg Funds, for instance. This is one where 
you’re indirectly influencing research, but it is done in a very careful and 
correct way. So there is not a question of directly demanding a special kind 
of research from business, but indirectly by funding the right people 
(Elvander 1993). 
While Elvander’s point is a valid one, it would be easy to draw a 
distorted inference from it, if unfamiliar with Swedish institutions: one of 
the most important set of “organizations” that dominated research funding 
in Sweden for decades was the extremely powerful group of labor unions. 
Conclusion 
Of the four themes that I identified in the more extensive interview 
study, this chapter focused on the narrowness of opinion among 
economists involved in the Swedish public debate of 1992–93. I noted that 
virtually all the interviewees agreed with this assessment, but most also 
pointed out that the range of economic analysis had been equally narrow in 
Sweden’s past. I briefly outlined the historical context of Sweden’s grand 
public policy debates beginning nearly one hundred years earlier: some of 
Sweden’s most well-known economists of the twentieth century took part 
in public persuasion of one kind or another. I then attempted to account for 
the narrowness of public opinion by Sweden’s economists and argued that 
some basic insights from the economics of science can shed some 
theoretical light on this phenomenon: if idea production and dissemination 
are subject to increasing returns to scale, then it is likely that a narrow 
range of views will dominate at any given time, particularly given the 
traditional concentration of professorships and resources in Sweden. 
Most Swedes—and indeed most policy experts elsewhere—do not 
recognize the connection between the undercurrents of 1990’s debate and 
previous ones. For one, the Swedish debate and Swedish policy 
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implementation have much to offer policymakers facing similar crises in 
the United States and Europe twenty years later. Indeed, Sweden’s 
anticipation of these more far-reaching European and American crises is 
not unlike its presaging many of the debates over the building of 
redistributive policies in the first place. For another, it is remarkable how 
much the Swedish policy (and debate) terrain of the 1990s look like the 
one described by Myrdal in 1930 (1990). Like the 1920s and 1930s, a 
small group Swedish economists were deeply involved in trying to 
persuade both the public and policymakers in the early 1990s.  
One of the most noteworthy results of comparing and contrasting the 
two debates is the reversal of the internal-external argument between the 
two time periods. In the 1930s, it was the laissez-faire economists who 
argued that Sweden’s problems were external (Carlson, 1993, 138), while 
the champions for change argued that the causes for its economic distress 
were fundamentally internal. Hence, the analyses that implicated internal 
causes of the 1920s and 1930s economic crisis led to policy conclusions 
favoring activist economic and social reform, in other words, a move away 
from laissez-faire policies and toward the development of more substantial 
redistributive institutions. The market proponents of the 1920s and 1930s 
argued the reverse. They insisted that Sweden’s difficulties, at that time, 
were caused by the outside world: profoundly altering Swedish laissez-
faire policies would only weaken its future economic prospects.  
As we have seen, it was the market-oriented reformers during the 
1990’s debate who argued the causes of economic crisis were internal and 
therefore pushed for fundamental policy change. The juxtaposition of the 
internal causes argument being used to justify radical interventionist and 
redistributive policies in the 1930s and also being used to justify a radical 
break with those same polices in the 1990s raises the question of whether 
those involved in public debate simply employ whatever set of causes suits 
their purposes—purely instrumentally—in order to justify their policy 
conclusions, or whether they come to their policy motivations neutrally or 
“scientifically,” as it were. I consider this issue at greater length in the 
wider interview analysis presented at the RATIO conference. 
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